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I. INTRODUCTION
A boy’s life can change in seconds.1 Alex is fourteen years old and sits alone
at a table with two chairs in a dim, empty room that has only a closed door, and a
large horizontal mirror across one wall.2 He sits anxiously in silence as his heart
pumps rapidly and fear begins to settle over him.3 Seconds turn to minutes;

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2018; B.S.,
Criminal Justice, California State University of Sacramento, 2014. I would like to thank my faculty advisor,
Distinguished Professor of Law Michael Vitiello, primary editor, Heather, and chief comment editor, Charles,
for their tremendous support, guidance, and suggestions. Also, to my family for always believing in me and
encouraging me when I need it the most. Lastly, but never least, to my high school sweetheart Debbie for being
the driving force behind everything I do, and for reminding me of what is truly important in life.
1. Cf. Erik Ortiz, Davontae Sanford, Wrongly Convicted of 4 Murders at Age 14, to Be Freed, NBC NEWS
(June 8, 2016, 10:57 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/davontae-sanford-wrongly-convicted-4murders-age-14-be-freed-n588206 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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minutes turn to hours.4 He keeps asking himself, “Why am I here, can’t I just go
home?”5
Just yesterday, Alex was sitting at school in history class searching for the
perfect colored pencil to take notes with.6 It was a normal day until two
uniformed police officers rushed into the classroom; their eyes on Alex, Alex’s
eyes on their holstered guns.7 They picked Alex up, handcuffed him, and escorted
him to the back of their patrol car.8 Now, he sits alone in this interrogation room.9
He wants to talk to his mom, but he can’t.10 He wants to go home, but he can’t.11
The door slams open and the same officers walk towards him.12 “Do you
understand your rights?”13 He doesn’t, but he doesn’t want them to think he’s not
listening to them, so he says, “Yes.”14 For the next hour, the officers explain that
he is implicated in a home robbery that occurred near the school last week.15 He
denies it, but they persist.16 They tell him they have the evidence to prove it even
though they don’t, and that he should tell them the truth so he can finally go
home.17 But he doesn’t go home, Alex sits in jail for ten years until his innocence
is proven.18
Although hypothetical, Alex's case seems rare—but indeed cases like this
happened in 1962, recently in 2016, and can be seen in trending documentaries
like the Netflix show Making a Murderer.19 Juveniles are still being questioned
without knowing that they hold constitutional rights that protect them from being
forced to talk to the police.20 For example, in 1962, fourteen-year-old Robert
Gallegos and a friend robbed and assaulted an older man for thirteen dollars.21
The police arrested Gallegos twelve days later.22 At no point did an adult, parent,

4. Id
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Cf. Ortiz, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Cf. Ortiz, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Cf. Ortiz, supra note 1.
19. Id.; see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Steve Almasy, ‘Making a Murderer’:
Brendan Dassey Conviction Overturned, CNN (August 12, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/ 2016/08/12/us/makinga-murderer-brendan-dassey-conviction-overturned/ (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review).
20. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49; Almasy, supra note 19.
21. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49.
22. Id. at 50.
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or attorney advise him of his rights or on what to do in this situation.23 Gallegos’s
mother attempted to visit him but was not allowed to see him.24 Finally, after a
week of being held in juvenile hall, he signed a formal confession.25 Using his
formal confession against him, the jury found Gallegos guilty and sentenced him
to life in prison.26
The U.S. Supreme Court held Gallegos’s confession was involuntary.27 The
Court reasoned that Gallegos “cannot be compared with an adult in full
possession of his sense[s] and knowledgeable of the consequences of his
admissions.”28 Without advice about his rights and the benefit of more mature
judgment, Gallegos, according to the court, “would have no way of knowing
what the consequences of his confession were,” or “the steps he should take in
the predicament in which he found himself.”29
Originally, the Supreme Court evaluated confessions under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteen Amendment.30 The Court evaluated the specific facts of
each case under the totality of the circumstances to determine if a confession was
given voluntarily.31 After deciding several cases, the Court found that the
relevant factors from these cases did not create an easily-applicable standard to
guide law enforcement and decided to create a bright-line rule.32 The Court in
Miranda v. Arizona stated that some form of protection is necessary during
inherently coercive interrogations to ensure a suspect actually knows his rights
and can exercise them.33 Miranda declared that warnings34 are required before
police can conduct a custodial interrogation of a suspect.35 However, Miranda’s
broad protections were subsequently narrowed, making it easy to waive these
rights, yet difficult to invoke them.36
Today, when an officer provides a juvenile these familiar Miranda
warnings,37 the law considers the juvenile informed and knowledgeable of his
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 50.
27. Id. at 61.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Id.
30. Infra Part II.
31. Infra Part II.
32. Infra Part II.
33. 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
34. Id. (“[H]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”).
35. Id.
36. Infra Part III.
37. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (”He has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
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rights.38 However, comprehension studies consistently show that juveniles fail to
understand the words, meaning, and legal significance of the Miranda
warnings.39 Accordingly, juveniles are left defenseless during coercive
interrogations.40 When faced against skilled officers, an uninformed juvenile can
falsely confess without understanding the life-altering consequences of
succumbing to the pressures of his or her interrogators.41 For example, Gallegos
was “not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the
consequences,” and was “unable to know how to protect his own interests[,] or
how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.”42 Interrogating juveniles, like
Gallegos or Alex, without any type of effective warning treats them as if they
have no constitutional rights.43
Miranda is only effective if understood by the listener.44 Juveniles exist in a
pre-Miranda era, and fail to understand the rights and privileges they are entitled
to, yet, are subjected to an inherently coercive interrogations.45 As a
consequence, almost all juveniles “waive” their Miranda rights because courtcrafted legal standards make it difficult for juveniles to invoke their rights.46
Miranda fails to recognize juvenile developmental immaturity by treating them
as adults.47 Ignoring their unique characteristics deprives them of these
fundamental rights and provides only constitutional words without any real
significance.48
Miranda must return to its spirit and purpose and be reexamined to
adequately protect juveniles whose unique characteristics make them “an easy
victim of the law.”49 Either the legislature or the courts must take the initiative to
restore Miranda.50 Some states have enacted legislation to do just that, and others
have attempted but failed.51 In 2016, California took this initiative with Senate
Bill 1052.52 Exploring the essential characteristics that adequate legislation must
have can assist legislatures in either drafting legislation or attempting to amend

attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”).
38. Infra Part II.
39. Infra Part IV.
40. Infra Part IV.
41. Infra Part IV. B.
42. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
43. Id. at 55.
44. Infra Part IV.
45. Infra Parts II & III.
46. Infra Part IV.
47. Infra Parts II & IV.
48. Compare infra Part II, with III, and IV.
49. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
50. Infra Part V.
51. Infra Part V.
52. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not enacted).
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existing legislation.53 Additionally, recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the
Court’s recognition and sympathy for the unique characteristics of juveniles that
justify a return to Miranda’s broad protection.54 Counsel for juveniles can
pressure courts to take the initiative to reexamine Miranda and the holdings that
transformed it.55
Part II of this Comment explains the significance of the Due Process Clause,
the right to remain silent, the Miranda decision, and subsequent cases that
narrowed Miranda’s broad application.56 Part III discusses neurological,
developmental, and legal differences between juveniles and adults that warrant
treating juveniles differently from adults, and also examines the recent Supreme
Court trend providing additional protection to juveniles.57 Part IV illustrates the
unfair consequences of treating juveniles the same as adults under Miranda.58
Part V explores two solutions: (1) legislation and its essential characteristics,
using California’s SB 1052 as a model; and (2) reevaluation by courts of the
current Miranda framework.59
II. MIRANDA BACKGROUND
Originally, the Supreme Court regulated the admissibility of confessions
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 The Court
found that physical and psychological coercion resulting in a confession violated
the Due Process Clause and was inadmissible because the confession was not
given as a free and rational choice.61 The Court adopted a voluntariness test that
evaluated the admissibility of a confession by examining the totality of the
circumstances of each individual case.62 This case-by-case approach requires a
fact specific inquiry.63
For example, Brown v. Mississippi was the first case where the Court struck
down a state conviction because of how the confession was obtained.64 In Brown,
a mob of white men went to Ed Brown’s home and accused him of a crime.65
After he denied the accusation, the mob hung him from a tree three times, each
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Infra Part V.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part V.
Infra Part II.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part V.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936).
Id. at 283; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959).
Brown, 297 U.S. at 287.
Id. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 287.
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time failing to kill him.66 Brown continued to express his innocence while the
mob tied him to the tree and whipped him.67 Brown continued to declare his
innocence.68 The mob left Brown’s home and two days later a deputy came to
arrest Brown.69 Again, Brown was severely whipped.70 The deputy told Brown
the whipping would continue unless he confessed.71 Brown succumbed and
confessed.72 The Court found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteen
Amendment requires states to act in accordance with the fundamental principles
of liberty and justice.73 The Court determined that the manner the officers
obtained the confession was repulsive to justice, and thus, unconstitutional.74
In later cases, the Court found confessions involuntary when officers used
psychological manipulation or exhaustion, even in the absence of actual torture.
In Spano v. New York, Vincent Spano shot someone after his money was taken
from him and Spano was injured in a fight.75 After turning himself in, the police
questioned Spano through the evening and into the early morning for eight hours
straight.76 Spano consistently refused to answer questions and repeatedly
requested for his attorney’s presence, but the police rejected these requests and
the questioning persisted.77 The police then had another officer named Bruno,
who had been Spano’s friend since childhood, attempt to get a confession out of
Spano three times, but to no avail.78 Bruno’s fourth attempt lasted an hour, and
Spano finally confessed.79 The Court examined these facts and determined that
the confession was involuntarily made, and resulted in Spano’s free will being
overcome and violated the Fourteenth Amendment.80

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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Id. at 281.
Id.
Brown, 297 U.S. at 281.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
Id.
Spano, 360 U.S. at 316.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 319.
Id.
Id, at 324.
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The Court explained the reasoning for excluding the statement:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not
turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deeprooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law;
that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal
methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves.81
Thirty years after Brown, the Court established several factors to guide this
involuntariness inquiry, but they were confusing for lower courts and law
enforcement to apply and it was unclear what the general philosophy was.82 As a
result, the Court desired to establish a bright-line rule.83 This bright-line rule
would guide law enforcement and would not require an individual analysis of
voluntariness for each confession.84 In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court attempted
to apply the Sixth Amendment’s protection of the assistance of counsel to create
this bright-line rule.85 There, the Court held that officer’s violated the Sixth
Amendment when they denied Escobedo’s request to speak to his attorney and
did not advise Escobedo of his right to remain silent during an interrogation that
took place before charges were filed.86 However, the Court did not pursue the
Sixth Amendment as a means to establish a bright-line rule, but rather shifted its
focus to the Fifth Amendment in Miranda.87
The Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause was originally understood to
apply to statements made in the courtroom.88 However, in 1966, the Court
extended this understanding to interrogations in Miranda v. Arizona.89 In
Miranda, the Court declared all custodial interrogations to be so inherently
coercive that each required a procedural safeguard in place to allow a suspect to
truly exercise his or her Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent.90 With this
purpose in mind, the Court announced that law enforcement must advise a
suspect of certain Miranda warnings before engaging in a custodial
81. Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21.
82. Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police
Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 750–751 (1987).
83. Id. at 752; JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIM. PROC.: INVESTIGATING CRIME 580 (4th ed. 2010).
84. Herman, supra note 83, at 752; DRESSLER, supra note 83, at 580.
85. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
86. DRESSLER, supra note 83, at 580.
87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
88. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892).
89. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (federal prosecutions); 384 U.S. at 436 (state
prosecutions).
90. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (stating that the Fifth Amendment provides a suspect with the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination and the right to consult with counsel or have counsel present prior to or
during police questioning).

241

2017 / “Do You Understand These Rights?” A Juvenile Perspective of Miranda
interrogation.91 These warnings include advising a suspect that (1) he or she has
the right to remain silent, (2) anything he or she says can be used against them,
(3) he or she has the right to counsel, and (4) if they cannot afford counsel, one
will be provided to them.92 The court created a bright-line rule applicable to all
suspects, regardless of age, with the purpose of providing law enforcement with
an easily enforceable and practical standard.93 Although briefly mentioned in
Miranda, subsequent cases clarified the applicable standards for a suspect to
either waive or invoke their Miranda rights.94 In doing so, those cases
significantly narrowed Miranda’s broad protections.95
For example, in Miranda the Court stated that, once a suspect is advised of
the Miranda warnings, he or she can waive them if they do so knowing what
rights they have, are intelligent of the consequences of waiving those rights, and
is done voluntarily.96 However, a more conservative Court later found that as
long as a suspect receives the Miranda warnings and then makes a voluntary
statement, a court could presume the suspect knowingly and intelligently
understood their rights and the consequences associated with waiving them.97
This essentially narrowed Miranda’s original protection by narrowing when a
suspect is considered knowledgeable and intelligent of the Miranda warnings.98
Likewise, the Miranda Court originally indicated that, once a suspect
invokes either the right to remain silent or the right to the assistance of counsel,
all questioning must cease.99 But, again, the Court narrowed the broad safeguard
intended by Miranda when it defined the standard for a suspect to adequately
invoke their rights.100 Now, if a suspect decides he or she wishes to exercise their
rights, they must do so unambiguously to the degree of clarity that a reasonable
officer under the circumstances would understand that the suspect was making
such a request.101 This unambiguous standard provides courts with the arbitrary
power to determine what is considered a sufficiently clear request.102 For
91. Id.
92. Id. at 479; California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (holding that the Miranda warnings do not have
to state the exact language in Miranda but must reasonably convey the rights included in the original four
warnings).
93. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
94. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
95. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79, with Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; see also Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing a confession in violation of Miranda to be used to impeach a defendant).
96. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
97. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79, with Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62.
98. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79, with Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62.
99. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
100. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; People v. Soto, 204 Cal. Rptr. 204, 213 (2nd Dist. 1984).
101. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979).
102. People v. Roquemore, 131 Cal. 4th 11, 25 (2005) (“[D]efendant’s subsequent statement that he was
confused and “[C]an I call a lawyer or my mom to talk to you?” did not constitute an unequivocal request for
counsel to be present”); Fare, 442 U.S. at 723–24 (declining “to find that the request for the probation officer is
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example, the Court held that when a suspect decides to merely sit in silence after
being advised that he or she has the right to remain silent, and is subsequently
questioned by law enforcement, they fail to unambiguously invoke their right to
remain silent.103 Such a requirement runs contrary to the colloquial meaning of
“remaining silent” and has narrowed the originally broad protection in
Miranda.104
Generally, juveniles are unable to understand and comprehend the Miranda
warnings105 and this narrowing makes it difficult for them to meet the stringent
standards to invoke their rights.106 Juveniles are essentially defenseless to
continuous police badgering, yet capable of easily waiving their rights.107
III. JUVENILES: A SPECIAL CATEGORY
As a result of Miranda’s bright-line rule, its standards apply to all suspects,
and therefore juveniles under custodial interrogation are generally treated as if
they were fully developed adults.108 Juveniles receive the same Miranda
warnings,109 and if they wishes to waive these rights, they may do so as easily as
an adult by simply making an uncoerced statement after receiving these
warnings.110 Yet, if they chooses to end the questioning and invoke their rights,
they are expected to express such a request under the same unambiguous
standard as an adult.111
However, juveniles hold unique developmental characteristics and
vulnerabilities that warrant treating them differently than adults.112 Treating
juveniles differently ensures that they have a meaningful opportunity to exercise
the same rights and privileges as adults.113 Part A illustrates how juveniles are
developmentally immature by examining emerging cognitive and developmental

tantamount to a request for an attorney”).
103. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966).
105. Infra Part IV.
106. Infra Part IV.
107. Infra Part IV.
108. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380 (2010) (failing to differentiate a separate standard for
a suspect to waive their rights depending on their age); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 (1979)
(finding a defendant with an 11th grade education is held to the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard);
People v. Whitson, 949 P.2d 18, 28 (Cal. 1998).
109. See generally In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2015).
110. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
111. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979).
112. Infra Part A.
113. Infra Part V.
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science.114 Part B explains how the Court recognizes this immaturity in other
legal contexts and how the Miranda framework is behind this trend.115
A. Developmental Immaturity
The problem with treating juveniles the same as adult is that juveniles are
psychologically and physiologically different than adults.116 Brain development
happens in stages throughout the juvenile’s adolescent years, creating different
thinking and behavior.117 His or her frontal lobe, which regulates decisionmaking, planning, judgment, and impulse control, drastically changes during
their adolescent years and is the last part of their brain to fully develop.118
Because of the under-development of the frontal lobe, the limbic system stands in
for the frontal lobe to process their emotions.119 However, the limbic system also
undergoes rapid development during their adolescent years, causing them to
engage in more impulsive behavior and experience more mood swings than
adults.120 Additionally, dopamine production, a chemical linking action to
pleasure, significantly shifts during their adolescent years causing them to engage
in more risky behavior.121 However, when juveniles make these risky choices,
they do not engage the higher thinking areas of the brain, as opposed to adults
who do.122
Also, juveniles are less future-oriented than adults.123 Juveniles generally
believe planning ahead is a waste of time, are more focused on being happy in
the present, and fail to consider the multiple consequences of making a

114. Infra Part A.
115. Infra Part B.
116. Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI
Study, NATURE NEUROSCIENCE Vol. 2, no. 10 (1999).
117. See, id. at 861; Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, in
ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT: VULNERABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES, ed. Ronald E. Dahl and Linda
Patia Spear, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 1021 (2004); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic
Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 101, 8174 (2004); Arthur W. Toga, Paul M. Thompson, & Elizabeth R.
Sowell, Mapping Brain Maturation, TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES Vol. 29, no. 3, 148–59 (Mar. 2006).
118. See, Giedd, supra note 861; Giedd, supra note 118; Gogtay, supra note 118; Toga, supra note 118.
119. Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, NAT’L
JUV. JUST. NETWORK, (last visited Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/BrainDevelopment-Policy-Paper_Updated_FINAL-9-27-12.pdf..
120. Id.
121. Linda Patia Spear, Neurodevelopment During Adolescence, in 12 MECHANISMS IN
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, ed. Dante Cicchetti and Elaine F. Walker, 62-83 (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
122. Neir Eshel et al., Neural Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults and Adolescents,
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA Vol. 45, no. 6, 1270–79 (2007).
123. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD
DEV. 28, 34 (2009).
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decision.124 Similarly, while adults perceive multiple options in a particular
situation, juveniles may perceive only one, further limiting their understanding of
how to escape a difficult situation.125 Juveniles are also less capable of
responding to stressful situations than adults because they lack the same exposure
to these situations.126 Generally, juveniles are conditioned from childhood to
respect and abide by authority figures,127 while hormonal and psychosocial
changes make them put a higher emphasis on acceptance by others.128 This
increases their susceptibility to peer pressure.129 These cognitive and
developmental differences create a uniquely vulnerable suspect during a
custodial interrogation.130 During interrogations, law enforcement agents attempt
to overcome the will of a juvenile, and the Miranda warnings are the only
safeguard in place to mitigate the inherently coercive nature of custodial
interrogations.131
B. Legally Treated Differently
The Court treats juveniles differently from adults in other aspects of the law
due to developmental and cognitive science.132 The Court reshaped legal
principles as applied to juveniles to fully protect their constitutional rights.133 The
following cases illustrate how the Miranda framework is currently behind by not
treating juveniles differently in the interrogation room.134

124. Id.
125. Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15 CRIM.
JUST. 26 (2000); Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 7 KY. CHILD RTS. J. 16, 17–18 (1999).
126. See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court in YOUTH
ON TRIAL: A DEV. PERSP. ON JUV. JUST 9–3; Thomas Grisso and Robert G. Schwartz eds., (2000) (explaining
that even when older adolescents attain raw intellectual abilities comparable to those of adults, their relative
lack of experience may impede their ability to make sound decisions).
127. Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children’s Rights, 16 NOVA L.
REV. 711, 716 (1992) (noting that children are socialized to obey authority figures).
128. See id.
129. See id. (noting that children are socialized to obey authority figures); Kimberly Larson, Improving
the “Kangaroo Courts”: A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles’ Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV.
629, 657 (2003) (summarizing psychological research reporting that “children are more compliant and
suggestible than adults”).
130. Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky
Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEV. PSYCHOL. 625, 629–30
(2005); See Beyer, supra note 125, at 27.
131. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
132.. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2042 (2010);
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457–58 (2012); J.B.D. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011).
133. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–69; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2042; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–58; J.B.D., 564
U.S. at 277.
134. Compare Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–69; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2042; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–58;
J.B.D., 564 U.S. at 277, with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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In Roper v. Simmons, seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons committed
murder.135 When Christopher turned eighteen, a trial judge sentenced him to
death.136 On appeal, the Court recognized that a juvenile is “categorically less
culpable than the average [adult] criminal.”137 As a result, the Court found it
unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to death.138
The Court indicated developmental reasons why juveniles, when compared
to adults, cannot be sentenced to death.139 First, “[j]uveniles' susceptibility to
immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’”140 Second, a juvenile’s “own
vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings
mean[s] juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to
escape negative influences in their whole environment.”141 The Court drew the
line at the age of eighteen because it “is the point where society draws the line for
many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”142
In Graham v. Florida, seventeen-year-old Terrance Graham committed a
burglary, and, as part of a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to
probation.143 Subsequently, Terrance committed another crime while on
probation, and as a result, the trial court sentenced Terrance to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.144 The Court held that sentencing a minor to life
in prison without the possibility of parole for committing a non-homicidal
offense was unconstitutional.145 The Court found this punishment to be
“especially harsh for a juvenile offender, who will on average serve more years
and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”146 The Court
also stated that a categorical rule banning this punishment “gives the juvenile
offender a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”147
In Miller v. Alabama, a jury convicted sixteen-year-old Evan Miller of
murder and sentenced him to a mandatory term of life in prison without the
possibility of parole.148 By studying neurology, the Court found the mandatory
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, for a juvenile, to be
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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Id. (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
Id. at 574.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010).
Id. (stating that Florida did not have a parole system in place at the time).
Id. at 2042.
Id. at 2016.
Id. at 2017.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2012).
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unconstitutional.149 The Court explained that “‘youth is more than a
chronological fact’ . . . [i]t is a time of immaturity, irresponsibility,
‘impetuousness[,] and recklessness’ . . . [i]t is a moment and ‘condition of life
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage.’”150
These cases demonstrate how developmental and cognitive differences
between juveniles and adults justify applying different legal standards for the
same constitutional right.151 Recent changes to the custody analysis recognize
these differences;152 yet, other Miranda aspects are behind this developmental
change.153 Specifically, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, a uniformed police officer
and school personnel took a thirteen-year-old, seventh-grade student from his
classroom and placed him in a closed-door conference room to question him.154
The uniformed officer did not advise J.D.B. of his Miranda rights or tell him that
he was free to leave.155 After the officer pressured him to tell the truth, J.D.B.
confessed, although initially denying any involvement in the suspected
burglary.156 After J.B.D. confessed, the officer finally read him the Miranda
warnings.157 J.D.B. argued that he was in custody during the questioning, and,
thus that the officer was required to advise him of the Miranda warnings before
any questioning took place.158
By distinguishing between juveniles and adults, the Court supplemented the
in-custody framework of Miranda.159 In doing so, the Court stated that “children
cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults[,] . . . [c]hildren ‘generally are less
mature and responsible than adults,’ . . . they ‘often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them,’ . . . and they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . .
outside pressures’ than adults.”160 The Court justified modifying the in-custody
framework of Miranda for juveniles by stating that “events that ‘would leave a
man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a’ teen.”161

149. Id. at 2457–58.
150. Id. at 2467.
151. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2042; Miller, 132 S. Ct.
at 2457–58; J.B.D., 564 U.S. at 277.
152. J.B.D. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011).
153. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2042; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–58; J.B.D., 564
U.S. at 277, with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
154. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2396.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2397.
161. Id.
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These cases demonstrate how emerging developmental science and research
change court application of legal principles to fairly apply them to juveniles.162
Apart from the criminal context, society also treats juveniles different than adults
by imposing several age restrictions on activities.163 Juveniles cannot drive
without a learner’s permit until they are eighteen,164 serve our country without
parental permission until eighteen,165 get married until eighteen,166 vote until
eighteen,167 drink until twenty-one,168 buy cigarettes until twenty-one,169 convey
real property, or execute a binding contract until they are eighteen.170 Yet,
according to existing law, as young as ten years old, they can waive fundamental
constitutional rights.171
Similar to J.D.B., the Miranda framework needs to catch up and recognize
developmental differences and not simply view juveniles as miniature adults.172
The Miranda framework must be modified when applied to juveniles to prevent
the unfairness associated with treating juveniles like adults.173
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING THE CURRENT MIRANDA STANDARD TO
JUVENILES
This section explains the grave and irreversible consequences of applying the
Miranda standard to juveniles.174 Part A explains how juveniles do not
understand and comprehend the Miranda warnings.175 Part B demonstrates how

162. See infra Part III. Part B (referencing J.D.B., Miller, and Miranda).
163. Department of Motor Vehicles, License and ID, Age Requirements, (last visited Apr. 8, 2017),
http://www.dmv.org/ca-california/teen-drivers.php (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review).
164. Id.
165. United States of America, Join the Military, Requirements for Joining the U.S. Military, (last visited
Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.usa.gov/join-military; https://www.thebalance.com/us-military-enlistmentstandards-3354001 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review); Rod Powers, US Military Enlistment
Standards: How Old is Too Old? Each Branch of the Service had Different Upper Age Limits, (last visited Apr.
8, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/us-military-enlistment-standards-3354001 (on file with The University of
Pacific Law Review).
166. Legal Age of Consent for Marriage and Sex for the 50 United States, Global Justice Initiative, (last
visited Apr. 8, 2017), https://globaljusticeinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/united-states-age-of-consenttable11.pdf..
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
168. 23 C.F.R. § 1208.4.
169. 175 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17537.3 (West 2017).
170. I.C.1971, 32—22—1—1, BURNS s 56—102 (West 2017) (stating a juvenile is unable to convey real
property); I.C.1971, 29—1—18—41 (West 2017), BURNS s 8—141 (West 2017) (stating a juvenile is unable to
execute a binding contract).
171. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2015).
172. J.B.D. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011).
173. Infra Part IV.
174. Infra Part IV.
175. Infra Part A.
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juveniles lack the capacity to invoke these rights.176 Part C illustrates juveniles’
vulnerability in an interrogation room.177
A. Juveniles Fail to Knowingly Understand and Intelligently Appreciate the
Miranda Warnings
How can you exercise a right you do not know you have?178 Miranda’s
procedural safeguard is only effective if understood by the listener.179 Research
consistently shows that juveniles fail to understand the meaning of the words
used in Miranda, as well as the legal significance of each warning.180 When
juveniles fail to understand the rights and privileges they have during an
interrogation, the Miranda warnings are meaningless.181
For example, in 1980, a published study evaluated juveniles’ understanding
of their Miranda rights.182 When asked to paraphrase their Miranda rights, only
20.9% of juveniles demonstrated an adequate understanding, while 42.3% of
adults did.183 Furthermore, 55.3% of the juveniles demonstrate a lack of
understanding of at least one of the Miranda warnings, but when assessed on
their understanding of the vocabulary used in the Miranda warnings, only 33.2%
of the juveniles adequately understood the key words used, while 60.1 percent of
adults did.184 Also, 44.8% of the juveniles misunderstood their right to consult
with an attorney prior to an interrogation or to have an attorney present during
the interrogation, while only 14.6% of adults misunderstood these rights.185 This
study not only indicates that juveniles are twice as likely to misunderstand the
vocabulary and the legal significance of the Miranda warnings, but that they are
also three times as likely to not understand their right to the assistance of
counsel.186
Another study in 2011 found that age and intelligence predict a juvenile’s
comprehension of the Miranda warnings.187 Younger juveniles with lower

176. Infra Part B.
177. Infra Part C.
178. Infra Part A.
179. Infra Part IV.
180. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L.
REV. 1134, 1137 (1980); Kaitlyn McLachlan, Ronald Roesch & Kevin S. Douglas, Examining the Role of
Interrogative Suggestibility in Miranda Rights Comprehension in Adolescents, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 170–
71 (2011).
181. Infra Part IV.
182. Grisso, supra note 180, at 1134.
183. Id. at 1153.
184. Id. at 1153–54.
185. Id. at 1154.
186. Id. at 1153–54.
187. McLachlan, supra note 180, at 175.
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intelligence were the least likely to comprehend their Miranda rights and the
most likely to be overcome by law enforcement using negative feedback and
pressure.188 This study found that 42.5% of juveniles189 did not comprehend one
of the Miranda warnings, and 44.7% failed to understand some of the vocabulary
used in the Miranda warnings.190
These findings are consistent with other comprehension studies, showing not
only that juveniles fail to understand the Miranda warnings but do so at an
alarmingly high rate when compared to adults.191 However, most of these studies
were conducted in a controlled setting and not in a highly stressful policedominated interrogation room that could further influence a juvenile’s ability to
understand.192 Thus, during real, as opposed to staged settings, these findings
may be exacerbated.193
This lack of understanding may explain why juveniles are more likely to
“waive” their rights since they completely fail to understand the vocabulary used
in the Miranda warnings and its significance.194 For example, a 2006 study found
that 80% of juveniles waive their Miranda rights.195 Other studies have found
that as high as 90% of juveniles waive their rights.196 These studies indicate that
an alarming percentage of juveniles waive their rights,197 yet comprehension
studies demonstrate that half of juveniles fail to knowingly and intelligently

188. Id.
189. This study consisted of 12-19 year olds.
190. McLachlan, supra note 180, at 170–71.
191. Beyer, supra note 125, at 28 (reporting that more than half of juveniles did not understand the words
of the Miranda warning); A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 39, 53 (1970) (reporting that over 90% of the juveniles whom police interrogated waived their
rights, that a similar percentage did not understand the rights they waived, and that even a simplified version of
the language in the Miranda warning failed to cure these defects).
192. Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152; McLachlan, supra note 180, at 170–71.
193. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966), with Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152 and McLachlan,
supra note 180, at 170–71.
194. Compare McLachlan, supra note 180, at 170–71, with Barry Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to
Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26 (2006).
195. Barry Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops Question Kids, 47 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 1, 26 (2013).
196. Ferguson, supra note 191, at 53 (reporting that over 90% of the juveniles whom police interrogated
waived their rights); THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE 202 (1981) (reporting that about ninety-one percent of juveniles waived their Miranda rights and
agreed to talk with police); Feld, supra note 195 (indicating that 92.8 percent of the juveniles waived their
rights).
197. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the
Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 844 (1996) (reporting that “of suspects given their Miranda rights,
83.7% waived them”); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 266, 293
(1996) (reporting that almost two-thirds of all suspects questioned).
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understand what they have “waived.”198 Juveniles are, therefore, at a distinct
disadvantage because waivers must be made knowingly and intelligently.199
B. Juveniles Lack the Capacity to Invoke Their Rights
Even when juveniles do not understand and comprehend the Miranda
warnings, they can stop continuous police badgering by invoking the right to
remain silent or the right to the assistance of counsel.200 However, how can you
protect yourself if you do not know how?201 Courts require that an invocation be
unambiguous, such that a reasonable officer would understand the request to be
an invocation.202 This requirement is difficult for most juveniles to satisfy
because they do not possess the same communication skills as adults.203 While
almost all juveniles are found to “waive” their rights, rarely do juveniles
unambiguously invoke their rights properly.204
For example, a 1977 study found that only 10% of juveniles invoke their
rights, while 40% of adults do.205 Additionally, another study found that
randomly-selected juveniles arrested for alleged felonies invoked their rights
10% of the time.206 The requirement for an unambiguous invocation of their
rights is even harder to satisfy for younger juvenile suspects.207 For juveniles
under the age of fourteen, only 5 percent invoked their rights.208 Some juveniles
may fear an invocation could be used against them to demonstrate culpability.209
A 1980 study found that 61.8% of juveniles failed to recognize that a judge
cannot punish them for invoking their right to remain silent, while 21.7% of

198. McLachlan, supra note 180, at 170–71.
199. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
200. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
201. Infra Part B.
202. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979).
203. See id.; see also Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L. J. 259, 262–64 (1993) (focusing on the disadvantage of the unambiguous
standard for female defendants).
204. Compare Ferguson, supra note 191, at 53 (reporting that over 90% of the juveniles whom police
interrogated waived their rights), and GRISSO, supra note 196, at 202 (reporting that about ninety-one percent of
juveniles waived their Miranda rights and agreed to talk with police), and Feld, supra note 198 (indicating that
92.8 percent of the juveniles waived their rights), with Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of
Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339
(1977) (reporting that about 10% of juveniles invoked their rights during interrogation).
205. Pomicter, supra note 204, at 339 (reporting that about 10% of juveniles invoked their rights during
interrogation, compared to 40% of adults); see also Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152.
206. Pomicter, supra note 204, at 339.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152.
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adults recognized this.210 On the other hand, juveniles may wish to invoke their
rights, but may lack adult-like communication skills to meet the standard for an
unambiguous invocation of these rights.211
Juvenile that fail to meet this standard allow law enforcement to continue to
question them even when they wish to end the interrogation and be released from
custody.212 These studies demonstrate that juveniles lack the communication
skills to end police badgering.213
C. Juveniles are Easy Victims in a Police-Dominated Environment
2.1 million juveniles are arrest in the United States each year.214 In 2014,
California reported that law enforcement arrested 87,000 juveniles.215
Interrogations naturally create a coercive environment and can produce false
confessions.216 Law enforcement is required to read suspects the Miranda
warnings before an interrogation begins to protect against police coercion.217
Although the Miranda warnings are meant to act as a procedural safeguard,
interrogations still produce false confessions when Miranda is administered.218
Significantly, juveniles account for 35% of these false confessions.219
Juvenile are particularly vulnerable to producing false confessions.220
Generally, they are more compliant and obedient to police officers and may
provide false information simply to end a stressful conversation.221 Cognitive and
developmental research indicates that juveniles are short-term oriented and fail to
perceive long-term consequences.222 On the other hand, officers are trained to

210. Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152.
211. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979).
212. See id.
213. Compare Pomicter, supra note 204, at 339, with Fare, 442 U.S. at 724–25.
214. Puzzanchera and Adams, Juvenile Arrests, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (2009).
215. Kamala D. Harris, Juvenile Justice in California, CAL. DEPT. OF JUST. REP. 56, 2 (2014),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/misc/jj11/preface.pdf (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
216. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
217. Id.
218. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82
N. C. L. REV. 891, 907–08 (2004).
219. Id. at 945.
220. Id. at 919 (stating that “some individuals—particularly. . . juveniles—are more vulnerable to the
pressures of interrogation and therefore less likely to possess or be able to muster the physiological resources or
perspective necessary to withstand accusatorial police questioning”).
221. See Koocher, supra note 127, at 716 (noting that children are socialized to obey authority figures);
Larson, supra note 129, at 645–46 (summarizing psychological research reporting that “children are more
compliant and suggestible than adults”).
222. Steinberg, supra note 123, at 34.
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aggressively elicit all important information.223 In reality, a false confession can
irreversibly taint a juvenile’s subsequent trial, leading to a conviction for a crime
they did not commit.224 Courts should view such confession with “special
caution” because juveniles’ developmental immaturity, coupled with the lack of
an effective safeguard advising them of their rights and persistent officer
questioning, creates a distasteful recipe to produce unreliable information.225
Juvenile left alone in an interrogation room without any meaningful protection
are therefore an “easy victim of the law.”226
V. RESTORING THE SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF MIRANDA
Miranda’s original broad protection needs to be restored and returned to its
spirit and purpose.227 This is especially true for juveniles whose unique
developmental and cognitive characteristics leave them vulnerable to police
manipulation because they lack the capacity to knowingly and intelligently
understand the Miranda warnings.228 This can be achieved one of two ways.229
First, federal or state legislatures can pass laws.230 Although this option is
unlikely due to the current political landscape, it still provides value by providing
essential characteristics of such legislation to guide future legislatures or to
amend currently inadequate legislation.231 Second, courts themselves can
reevaluate the holdings that transformed Miranda.232 The current trend in
Supreme Court jurisprudence is to recognize the unique vulnerabilities and
characteristics specific to juvenile suspects that justify a return to Miranda’s
broad protection.233

223. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
224. See Drizin, supra note 218, at 1005; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Leo, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 429 (1998) (“Because a confession is universally treated as damning and
compelling evidence of guilt, it is likely to dominate all other case evidence and lead a trier of fact to convict
the defendant. A false confession is therefore an exceptionally dangerous piece of evidence to put before
anyone adjudicating a case. In a criminal justice system . . . police induced false confession ranks amongst the
most fateful of all official errors”).
225. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967).
226. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
227. Infra Part V.
228. Infra Part IV.
229. Infra Part V.
230. Infra Part V.
231. Infra Part V.
232. Infra Part V.
233. Infra Part IV.
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A. A Legislative Solution
Although the Supreme Court generally requires law enforcement to provide
Miranda warnings to a suspect,234 the Court sets only the minimum
requirements.235 Each individual state or the federal government may choose to
require additional requirements or safeguards so long as they provide the baseline
notice mandated by the Court.236 State or federal legislation needs to be enacted
to protect juveniles from inherently coercive interrogations237 and help recognize
that they are not adults and cannot be treated as such.238 Several states currently
recognize the unfairness of the current Miranda framework.239 This Comment
analyzes California Senate Bill 1052 (“SB 1052”) to determine the essential
characteristics needed for adequate legislation.240 After having passed both
234. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
235. Id. (“We encourage congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly
effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws.”); In re Patrick W., 104 Cal. App. 3d 615, 618 (2nd Dist. 1980) (”[A]lthough a California court must give
to a defendant at least as full rights as the Constitution of the United States . . . a California court may, in
applying our own state constitutional requirements, afford to a defendant rights greater than those required by
the federal Constitution.”).
236. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; In re Patrick W., 104 Cal. App. 3d at 618.
237. Infra Part IV.
238. Infra Part III.
239. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-170 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 13 years old
suspected of serious crimes must be read their Miranda rights and represented by an attorney throughout the
entire custodial process); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old
cannot waive their right to an attorney “without the written consent” of a parent); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5331 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old can waive their rights only with the agreement of their
parents and if their parent does not agree, the minor must consult with an attorney before they can waive their
rights); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(F) (West 2016) (prohibiting the admission of a statement by a minor
under 13 years old and presumes that a 13 or 14 year old minor is incapable of making a valid Miranda waiver);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(11) (West 2016) (stating that a minor 12 years old or younger must have
their parent waive their rights); REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511 (West 2016) (stating that a minor’s parent or
attorney must be present and informed of the minor’s rights for any custodial statement to be admissible but the
minor and parent may waive parental presence in writing); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-137 (West 2016)
(stating that a minor’s statement made during custodial interrogation is inadmissible in juvenile court unless a
parent is present and advised of the minor’s rights); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5-1 (West 2016) (stating that a
minor’s rights can be waived only by a parent or counsel unless the minor has been emancipated); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101(West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old cannot waive their Miranda rights
unless a parent or attorney is present); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-2-301 (West 2016) (stating that the
advisement of rights to a minor of 16 years or younger during a custodial interrogation must occur in the
presence of a parent, guardian, or an attorney).
240. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not enacted)
(SB 1052 required law enforcement to provide a juvenile with a consultation with an attorney before conducting
a custodial interrogation and before a juvenile could waive their rights. SB 1052 rejected the notion that a
juvenile could waive this consultation requirement and made it mandatory. However, SB 1052 allowed the law
enforcement to ignore this requirement when it reasonably believed information sought from the juvenile was
necessary to either protect life or property from a substantial threat. If law enforcement completely violated the
mandatory consultation requirement, a court would have taken the violation into consideration when
determining if a juvenile’s waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, rather than automatically
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legislative bodies of California, California’s governor vetoed SB 1052.241 SB
1052 provided a strong starting point, but only some of its components are useful
for future legislation.242
For this legislation to be effective, it must begin by requiring the presence of
an attorney when a juvenile is interrogated.243 Under SB 1052, it was generally
mandatory for law enforcement to provide a juvenile consultation with an
attorney prior to questioning.244 The problem with leaving juveniles alone in an
interrogation room is twofold. First, officers question juveniles in the same
manner as adults.245 Second, as mentioned, juveniles are developmentally
different than adults because they fail to understand the Miranda warnings, the
consequences of their statements, often "waive" their rights unknowingly, and
will almost never invoke these rights.246 Combining these ingredients creates a
dangerous result.247 The police may receive unreliable information and terminate
alternative explanations,248 while juveniles are left to explain in court why they
confessed to something they did not do.249 Juveniles do not understand the
Miranda warnings and legislation must presume that statements made by a
juvenile are per se unknowingly and unintelligently made.250 Only after
consulting with an attorney should this presumption be overcome.251 Like
Miranda, legislation must create a bright-line rule applying this requirement to
juveniles under a certain age.252 An appropriate age for this requirement would be
eighteen because society has determined that eighteen is the age that it “draws
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”253
excluding any subsequent statements).
241. Infra Part V.
242. Infra Part V.
243. SB 1052, 2016.
244. SB 1052, 2016.
245. N. Dickon Reppucci, Jessica Meyer, and Jessica Kostelnik, Police Interrogations and False
Confessions: Current Research, Practice, and Policy Recommendations, CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION OF JUV.:
RESULTS OF A NAT’L SURV. OF POLICE (2010).
246. Infra Part IV.
247. Cf. Ortiz, supra note 1.
248. Id.
249. Almasy, supra note 19.
250. Compare infra Part IV, with Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
251. See SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not
enacted).
252. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(11) (West 2016) (stating that a minor 12 years old or
younger must have their parent waive their rights); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101 (West 2016) (stating that
a minor under 16 years old cannot waive their Miranda rights unless a parent or attorney is present); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-2-301 (West 2016) (stating that the advisement of rights to a minor of 16 years or
younger during a custodial interrogation must occur in the presence of a parent, guardian, or an attorney), with
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
253. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005); see SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal.
2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not enacted).
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Currently, state legislation conflicts on whether the presence of an attorney is
required or if an adult can act as an adequate alternative.254 For example,
California’s SB 1052 required an attorney consultation, while Washington,
Colorado, and North Carolina find the assistance of a juvenile’s parent as an
adequate alternative to an attorney.255 The main purpose behind having either an
attorney or an adult present is to reduce the coercive nature of an interrogation,
but also to effectively convey to a juvenile the rights he or she has, their legal
significance, and the consequences associated with waiving them.256 A criminal
investigation requires a degree of sophistication and understanding of legal
principles that a parent lacks.257 A parent cannot substitute the assistance of an
attorney—who is the “one person to whom society as a whole looks as the
protector of the [juvenile’s] legal rights.”258 Unlike a parent, an attorney is better
suited to explain the constitutional rights that juveniles are entitled to, the legal
consequences associated with waiving them, and can assist juveniles with the
invocation of these rights.259
Significantly, research indicates that parents either fail to assist juveniles, or,
instead, help law enforcement by offering additional information.260 For example,
in one study, nearly three-quarters of parents disagreed with the idea that a
juvenile should be allowed to withhold information from the police.261 In another
study, more than two-thirds of the parents present during actual pre-interrogation
waiver proceedings offered no comments or advice to their children.262 An

254. § 13.40.140(11) (stating that a minor 12 years old or younger must have their parent waive their
rights); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511 (West 2016) (stating that a minor’s parent or attorney must be
present and informed of the minor’s rights for any custodial statement to be admissible but the minor and parent
may waive parental presence in writing); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-137 (West 2016) (stating that a
minor’s statement made during custodial interrogation is inadmissible in juvenile court unless a parent is
present and advised of the minor’s rights); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5-1 (West 2016) (stating that a minor’s
rights can be waived only by a parent or counsel unless the minor has been emancipated); § 7B-2101 (stating
that a minor under 16 years old cannot waive their Miranda rights unless a parent or attorney is present); tit.
10A, § 2-2-301 (stating that the advisement of rights to a minor of 16 years or younger during a custodial
interrogation must occur in the presence of a parent, guardian, or an attorney).
255. SB 1052, 2016; § 13.40.140(11) (stating that a minor 12 years old or younger must have their parent
waive their rights); § 19-2-511 (stating that a minor’s parent or attorney must be present and informed of the
minor’s rights for any custodial statement to be admissible but the minor and parent may waive parental
presence in writing); § 7B-2101 (stating that a minor under 16 years old cannot waive their Miranda rights
unless a parent or attorney is present).
256. Compare infra Part IV, with SB 1052, 2016.
257. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) (finding that a probation officer is not an adequate
substitute for an attorney).
258. Id.
259. See id. (finding that a probation officer is not an adequate substitute for an attorney).
260. Grisso & Ring, Parents’ Attitudes Toward Juveniles’ Rights in Interrogation, 6 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAVIOR 211 (1979).
261. Id.
262. THOMAS GRISSO, JUV. WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCH. COMPETENCE (1981).
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attorney is not expected to have a financial or emotional interest in a case and can
act objectively.263 Legislation must exclude parents as an adequate alternative
and expressly require that juveniles consult with only the unmatched assistance
of counsel.264
State legislation also conflicts on whether such a mandatory consultation
requirement can be waived, and, additionally, if juveniles or parents can waive
this requirement.265 For example, North Carolina allows a sixteen-year-old
juvenile to waive his or her rights only if a parent is present, while in Washington
the parent of a twelve-year-old can waive rights on behalf of the child.266 SB
1052 explicitly rejected the notion that juveniles can waive this requirement.267
Like SB 1052, legislation must reject juveniles’ ability to waive the consultation
requirement.268 First, juveniles fail to understand the significance of having or
waiving this consultation.269 Second, allowing juveniles to potentially waive this
requirement provides law enforcement with an incentive to manipulate juveniles
that are unintelligent and unknowing of their Miranda rights.270 Third, giving
juveniles the responsibility to exercise sacred constitutional rights runs in
contradiction with society restricting their engagement in significant decisions
and activities.271 Thus, lawmakers must recognize that juveniles fail to
understand the significance of waiving a consultation with an attorney and
neither juveniles or parents can waive the consultation requirement.272
Legislation must also prevent two negative characteristics of SB 1052.273
Legislation must expressly include a provision that deems juvenile statements
inadmissible when made without an attorney consultation.274 Just like Miranda,
when the incentive to circumvent the law is removed, law enforcement is more

263. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).
264. Compare SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not
enacted), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(11) (West 2016) (stating that a minor 12 years old or
younger must have their parent waive their rights).
265. § 13.40.140(11) (West 2016) (stating that a minor 12 years old or younger must have their parent
waive their rights); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old
cannot waive their Miranda rights unless a parent or attorney is present).
266. § 13.40.140(11) (stating that a minor 12 years old or younger must have their parent waive their
rights); § 7B-2101(West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old cannot waive their Miranda rights
unless a parent or attorney is present).
267. SB 1052, 2016.
268. Compare infra Part IV, with SB 1052, 2016.
269. Infra Part IV.
270. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1994).
271. Infra Part III.
272. Compare SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not
enacted), with infra Part IV.
273. Albert Mendoza, SB 1052: Miranda Warnings for Minors, Review of Selected 2016 California
Legislation, 48 U. PAC. L. REV. 475, 801 (2017).
274. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966), with SB 1052, 2016.
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likely to abide by its conditions.275 To illustrate, SB 1052 only required a court to
consider the effect of law enforcement violating its consultation requirement.276
In contrast, the Miranda warnings require all statements made in violation of
Miranda to be excluded under the exclusionary rule.277 By not requiring the
exclusion of these statements, SB 1052 essentially provided a solution that lacked
any real substance.278 Under SB 1052, law enforcement could completely
disregard the mandatory consultation requirement and still succeed in having a
juvenile’s statement admitted in court.279 Legislation must avoid a similar
invitation for abuse and expressly render statements as inadmissible when given
in violation of the consultation requirement.280
Lastly, legislation must also exclude exceptions and respect a juvenile’s
constitutional rights under all circumstances.281 Under Miranda and its progeny,
the Supreme Court created exceptions under the public safety exception that
reduced the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.282 SB 1052 also included an
exception where law enforcement could ignore the consultation requirement if it
reasonably believed a person or property to be in danger.283 Such exceptions
unfairly place conditions on a juvenile’s constitutional rights.284 However, a
juveniles protection should not be conditional and must be absolute.285 Unlike SB
1052, future legislation must exclude exceptions and respect a juvenile’s
constitutional rights under all circumstances.286
In sum, legislation must: (1) require the presence of an attorney when
juveniles are interrogated and create a presumption that juvenile statements are
not knowingly and intelligently made when an attorney is not present, (2) provide
that the presumption can be overcome only after they consult with an attorney,
(3) explicitly prohibit them the ability to waive this requirement, (4) exclude
exceptions, and (5) deem statements inadmissible when received in violation of
the consultation requirement.287

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

258

Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with SB 1052, 2016.
SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not enacted).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
Mendoza, supra note 273, at 801; SB 1052, 2016.
Mendoza, supra note 273, at 801; SB 1052, 2016.
Mendoza, supra note 273, at 801; SB 1052, 2016.
Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with SB 1052, 2016.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not enacted).
Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984).
See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with SB 1052, 2016.
Infra Part V.

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49
B. Judicial Reevaluation
The current political tensions in both federal and state legislatures make it
unlikely that the above legislative solution will be enacted in states, like
California, that have not already taken the initiative.288 However, courts
themselves can take the initiative to reevaluate the current Miranda framework
and restore Miranda’s spirit and purpose.289 Lawyers in every level of the court
system, both state and federal, can pressure courts to reexamine Miranda and
argue that the unique and vulnerable characteristics of juveniles require a
modified Miranda framework.290 Recent Supreme Court cases reflect a
willingness by the Court to recognize juvenile developmental immaturity and
modify legal standards to account for this immaturity.291 Attorneys can pressure
courts to either retract previous cases that substantially changed Miranda or to
create a separate legal framework for juveniles—“Miranda II” for example.292
This pressure can take several forms.293
Courts can require that juveniles consult with an attorney prior to
questioning.294 For example, in Lewis v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana
required that juveniles consult with either an adult, guardian, or attorney before
deciding to waive their rights if their statements were to be used against them at a
trial or at a hearing.295 There, seventeen-year-old Douglas Lewis was handed a
copy of the police department’s Miranda rights and waiver form, while an officer
read it out loud to him.296 After signing this form, Douglas confessed to an
assault and robbery that resulted in a death.297
The Court determined that clear rules were needed for efficient police
procedure and to protect important constitutional rights and found that the age of
a suspect could clearly define these standards.298 In terms of law enforcement, the
court reasoned that police officers should not decide in the heat of an
investigation the complex question of whether a waiver is legally sufficient when
made by a juvenile.299 On the juvenile side, the court reasoned that when a
juvenile is interrogated it is perhaps the most serious event of his or her young
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life.300 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Indiana concluded that treating juveniles
the same as an adult when they waive their constitutional rights would not only
be inconsistent with social norms, but also unjust.301 The court stating the
following:
The concept of establishing different standards for a juvenile is an
accepted legal principle since minors generally hold a subordinate and
protected status in our legal system. There are legally and socially
recognized differences between the presumed responsibility of adults and
minors. . . . As a result of this recognition minors are unable to execute a
binding contract, unable to convey real property, and unable to marry of
their own free will. It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold
that one whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry,
purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their own blood, should be
compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult when asked to waive
important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at a time most critical to
him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.302
Counsel for a juvenile can use the reasoning of the Indiana Supreme Court to
argue that a juvenile’s privilege against self-incrimination is violated when they
are only given the Miranda warnings.303 This direct pressure can force courts,
which are less vulnerable to political influence, to objectively determine if a
juvenile’s constitutional rights are truly being respected by considering Mirandarelated comprehension studies.304
Although the United States Supreme Court has limited Miranda to the
federal constitution, state courts may interpret their own constitutions and require
a higher standard.305 For example, the Supreme Court of Vermont, in In re E. T.
C., held that under the Vermont State Constitution juveniles can only voluntarily
and intelligently waive their right against self-incrimination and the assistance of
counsel after they are given an opportunity to consult in private with an informed
and genuinely interested adult who is completely independent and disassociated
from the prosecution, e.g., a parent or an attorney.306 In E. T. C., a fourteen-yearold was suspected of breaking into two condominiums with two friends located

300. Lewis, 259 Ind. at 439 (questioning “whether any child falling under the legally defined age of a
juvenile and confronted in such a setting can be said to be able to voluntarily, and willingly waive those most
important rights”).
301. Id., superseded and modified by the Indiana Legislature under Ind. Code Ann. § 31-32-5-1.
302. Id., superseded and modified by the Indiana Legislature under IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5-1.
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304. Id.
305. In re E. T. C., 141 Vt. 375, 378 (1982).
306. Id.
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across the highway from their group home.307 Two officers questioned the
juvenile in the group home director’s office and read the Miranda warnings.308
The director claimed he acted as the juvenile’s guardian even though he arranged
the interrogation.309
The court recognized that a juvenile cannot choose among the several options
of legal action without the advice of an adult and adopted the same reasoning as
the Supreme Court of Indiana.310 The court strictly applied the “genuinely
interested adult” requirement and found that the director did not satisfy this
standard even though he was present because “he was not paying attention . . .
[n]or did the director independently consult with the juvenile or ascertain if the
juvenile understood the alternatives open to him[,] . . . [and] the director coerced
the juvenile by implying it was best to ‘come clean’. . . .”311 Counsel for a
juvenile defendant can argue that their own state constitution requires more than
what the current Miranda framework requires.312 Using the same reasoning as the
Vermont Supreme Court, counsel can argue that under their state constitution
juveniles can only intelligently and voluntarily waive their rights when they are
assisted by an adult or an attorney.313 The “genuinely interested adult” model can
provide a foundation for the court to determine if such a requirement is necessary
given that juveniles fail to generally understand the Miranda warnings.314
Also, courts may create a per se rule of exclusion for juvenile statements and
only allow for this per se rule to be overcome after the prosecution has satisfied
strict requirements.315 For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in the Matter
of B.M.B., created a per se rule of exclusion for statements made by juveniles
under the age of fourteen.316 There, an officer questioned ten-year-old B.M.B.
about an alleged rape and persisted until he confessed.317 This per se rule can
only be overcome if the prosecution can show that the juvenile was given an
opportunity to consult with his parent, guardian, or attorney and both were
advised of the juvenile's right to an attorney and to remain silent.318 Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,319 and district and appellate courts in Georgia
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and Florida,320 have taken this same initiative. The court in the Matter of B.M.B.
reasoned that the trial court applied a superficial application of the totality of the
circumstances approach when it treated the defendant like an adult and found that
approach insufficient to ensure that a juvenile truly made an intelligent and
knowing waiver of his or her rights.321 Counsel for a juvenile can argue that a per
se rule should be adopted in their state courts because the application of the
totality of the circumstances standard to juveniles has been superficially applied
by the courts and a true evaluation of the unique characteristics of juveniles has
been neglected.322
Additionally, courts may mix a per se rule and a general requirement
depending on the age of the juvenile.323 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Smith, created a mixed approach to a per se
rule, placing certain requirements depending on the juvenile’s age.324 There, a
juvenile’s waiver is considered per se inadmissible if they are under the age of
fourteen unless a parent or an interested adult was present, understood the
juveniles rights, and had the opportunity to explain them to the juvenile.325
Alternatively, juveniles ages 14 to 17 must also be given this opportunity but a
waiver may still be valid without it if “the circumstances . . . demonstrate a high
degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the part of the
juvenile.”326 Such an approach creates a spectrum of standards that changes as
the juvenile’s ability to comprehend their Miranda rights increases.327 Counsel
for a juvenile can argue for this middle-ground approach to establish a per se rule
for younger juveniles and only a strict requirement for further developed
juveniles.328
Pressuring courts to determine if juveniles can meaningfully waive their
Miranda rights in light of developmental and cognitive studies, can encourage

320. Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga.App. 325 (1969), overruled by Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124 (1976); J.E.S.
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courts to take the initiative to truly protect juveniles during inherently coercive
interrogations.329 Miranda is a court-created doctrine, thus courts can modify
Miranda and restore its purpose and spirit.330
VI. CONCLUSION
Constitutional rights are fundamental to our freedom.331 Each person,
whether young or old, must be entitled to exercise these rights when they matter
most to them.332 The Supreme Court in Miranda attempted to ensure a suspect
could exercise these rights by crafting a bright-line rule that applies to all
suspects.333 However, the Miranda warnings and the framework currently in
place fail juveniles.334 Generally, juveniles do not understand what these
warnings guarantee.335 They do not have the communication skills required to
invoke these rights, and officers take advantage of this disparity to secure a
juvenile’s waiver and a confession.336
All people deserve the rights guaranteed in our Constitution.337 The unique
characteristics of a juvenile demands that a change be made today.338 Police can
no longer provide ritualistic Miranda warnings that mean nothing to a juvenile.339
Either legislative or judicial action is needed to ensure that juveniles enjoy the
same rights we all enjoy under the Constitution.340
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